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Abstract—We consider control of heterogeneous players re-
peatedly playing an anti-coordination network game. In an anti-
coordination game, each player has an incentive to differentiate
its action from its neighbors. At each round of play, players
take actions according to a learning algorithm that mimics the
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We show
that the learning dynamics may fail to reach anti-coordination in
certain scenarios. We formulate an optimization problem with the
objective to reach maximum anti-coordination while minimizing
the number of players to control. We consider both static and
dynamic control policy formulations. Relating the problem to
a minimum vertex cover problem on bipartite networks, we
develop a feasible dynamic policy that is efficient to compute.
Solving for optimal policies on benchmark networks show that
the vertex cover based policy can be a loose upper bound
when there is a potential to make use of cascades caused by
the learning dynamics of uncontrolled players. We propose an
algorithm that finds feasible, though possibly suboptimal, policies
by sequentially adding players to control considering their
cascade potential. Numerical experiments on random networks
show the cascade-based algorithm can lower the control effort
significantly compared to simpler control schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing methods that achieve globally optimal behavior
while conforming with the computational and informational
limitations of the players is of interest given the ubiquity
of noncooperative interactions that arise among actors in
networked systems, e.g., epidemics [1], energy [2], [3], se-
curity [4], communication [5] or autonomous systems [6].
Game theoretic learning algorithms are tractable decentralized
models for non-cooperative decision-making in networked sys-
tems. These algorithms accounting for local information access
[7] and coupled action spaces [8] guarantee convergence to
individually rational behavior, i.e., a Nash equilibrium action,
in certain classes of games, e.g., aggregative [9], [10], potential
[11], convex [12]. However, a Nash equilibrium, while being
optimal from the perspective of selfish individuals, can be
inefficient and undesired at the system level. A canonical
example of this is the tragedy of the commons which describes
the phenomenon of selfish learning behavior leading to the
worst possible outcome for the entire population [13]. Given
the possibility of emergence of undesired outcomes, there is
a need to develop incentive mechanisms in order to achieve
system-wide desired outcomes.
The major challenge in attaining globally desired outcomes
in networked systems is that individuals are selfish, hetero-
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geneous, and their actions are coupled while the centralized
incentive resources are costly. In this paper, we formulate this
challenge as the control of decentralized learning dynamics.
That is, players selfishly follow some game-theoretic learning
dynamics while a centralized authority aims to direct the
emergent behavior toward a desired outcome. The two main
issues we address with this formulation are the selection of
which players to control, and what control policy to implement
given the selected players.
This challenge is addressed in the literature by character-
izing the inefficiency of Nash equilibria [14], by designing
payoffs prior to start of the game to induce efficient Nash equi-
libria [15], or by developing control mechanisms [16]–[22].
Our approach falls into the last category of controlling players
to guide the learningdynamics towards desirable outcomes.
In this category, [16], [17] show a public advertising scheme
improves the efficiency of the emergent outcome for players
that act according to best-response dynamics and occasionally
listen to the advertised behavior. An alternative model designs
dynamic control incentives that affect every players’ payoffs
to which players best respond [18]. Minimum cost uniform
and targeted reward policies that induce complete coordination
among players that act according to best-response dynamics
in a network coordination game are developed in [19]. When
the goal is to minimize efficiency, [22] studies malicious
attacks that strategically perturb player learning dynamics in
a network coordination game. In a combined effort to select
which players to control and also how to control them, we
depart from these studies by characterizing control schemes
when the underlying interaction between players is an anti-
coordination game.
In this paper, we focus on controlling a subset of the players
in a network anti-coordination game with the aim to promote
maximum anti-coordination. Players belong to one of two
possible types. We assume there is a preferred selfish action
for each player in the absence of any neighboring players in
the network. That is, a player’s payoff decreases as more of
its neighbors belonging to the opposite type take the preferred
action (Section II). Such payoff dependencies can be used to
model individual behavior during the spread of an epidemic in
a population where the individual types are healthy and sick,
the actions represent the level of precautionary measures taken,
and payoffs capture the risk of disease transmission to healthy
from sick individuals with the preferred action being not taking
any measures [23]. Other examples include modeling indi-
vidual opinions in a politically polarized environment where
players would like to differentiate their actions from players
in opposing views [24], or modeling two competing species
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Fig. 1. Network game with binary types.
in an environment [25]. In these games, two neighboring
players anti-coordinate when at least one of the players do
not take the selfish action, e.g., one player in each link takes
a precautionary measure during an epidemic. Maximum anti-
coordination is achieved when there does not exist any link
with failed anti-coordination.
We assume players follow learning dynamics based on a
decentralized process of iterated elimination of strictly dom-
inated actions in the absence of any control [26] (Section
III). In the learning process, players eliminate all actions that
cannot be in a rational action profile in finite time (Theorem
1). This implies convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium
in dominance solvable games.
We formulate the minimum player control for anti-
coordination problem (MPCAC) as a mixed integer program
where the decision variables include which players to control,
and how to control them (Section V). We consider static and
dynamic control policies. In static MPCAC, a fixed subset
of players’ decisions are controlled for the entire learning
horizon. In dynamic MPCAC, the control policy can tempo-
rally influence player decisions. We find a feasible policy that
upper bounds the optimal dynamic MPCAC control policy by
solving a minimum cardinality vertex covering problem on a
reduced bipartite network (Theorem 2). This feasible policy
can be obtained by solving a linear program, and hence is
computationally feasible to compute.
In general, the vertex cover-based control policy is sub-
optimal if there exists a way to cause cascades of anti-
coordination among multi-hop neighbors via the learning
dynamics by only controlling a few players. We present
optimal policies on benchmark networks of arbitrary size for
every possible payoff constant values (Section VI). Some of
the optimal policies exhibit use of cascades to achieve anti-
coordination which exemplify the sub-optimality of the vertex
cover-based control policy. Based on the cascade inducing
policies, we also propose a greedy algorithm that finds a
feasible solution by sequentially selecting the player to control
with the highest potential for inducing a cascade of anti-
coordination (Section VII). We compare the greedy algorithm
with the vertex cover-based control policy, among several
other variants, in numerical experiments on random bipartite
networks (Section VIII).
II. ANTI-COORDINATION NETWORK GAMES
A game consists of a population of players i ∈ N :=
{1, . . . , n} that take action ai ∈ Ai in order to maximize
their utility function ui(·). We assume each player is in one
of two possible types si ∈ {0, 1}. The population is divided
into two disjoint sets S0 := {i ∈ N : si = 0} and
S1 := {i ∈ N : si = 1}. Only the actions of neighbors that
have the opposite type can affect a player’s utility function. For
instance, if a player is type 0, then its utility depends on actions
of its neighbors in S1. We can capture the payoff dependency
of players using a bipartite graph GB = (S0,S1, EB)—
see Figure 1. We define the neighborhood of player i as
Ni := {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ EB}. Then the utility function is
defined as ui : Ai×ANi → R whereANi =
∏
j∈Ni Aj . Given
the bipartite network GB , the network game with binary types
can be represented by the tuple Γ = {N ,A,GB , {ui}i∈N }.
The premise of an anti-coordination game is that a
player benefits if its opponents yield. Similarly, in an anti-
coordination network game, a player benefits if its neighbors in
the opposing type yield. We assume player i can take actions
between zero and one, i.e., Ai = [0, 1] for all i ∈ N . The
following utility function,
ui(ai,aNi) = ai
1− (c0(1− si) + c1si) ∑
j∈Ni
aj
 (1)
with c0 ∈ (0, 1) and c1 ∈ (0, 1) as constants, captures the
preferences of players to differentiate their actions from their
neighbors. Here, aNi are the actions of player i’s neighbors.
Action ai = 1 maximizes the utility if the term inside the
parentheses is positive. Otherwise, action ai = 0 maximizes
the utility. The constant 1 inside the parentheses means that
the preferred action is 1 regardless of the type of the player i.
The term that is subtracted from one captures the decrease in
the preference of the player to choose action 1. That is, as i’s
neighbors increase their action, the benefit of i from choosing
the preferred action decreases. This decrease depends on the
type of the player. If the player’s type is 0 (1), i.e., si = 0
(= 1), then the decrease is proportional to c0 (c1).
Below we provide examples for the anti-coordination net-
work game Γ with payoffs as in (1).
Example 1 (Disease spread on networks) Players want to
avoid disease transmission [23]. Each player is either healthy
(si = 0) or sick (si = 1). The network GB is a contact network
with each edge representing a chance of disease transmission
between a healthy and a sick player. The action space captures
the social distancing level of a player with action ai = 0
representing self-isolation and action ai = 1 representing
resuming normal activity. Actions between 0 and 1 represent
different levels of disease prevention measures, e.g., covering
cough, or washing hands often. Resuming normal activity
is the preferred action. However, if both players at the two
ends of an edge take action 1, then there is a chance of
disease transmission. Accordingly, the constant c0 captures
a healthy player’s sensitivity for avoiding a risky interaction.
The constant c1 captures a sick player’s sensitivity to avoid
transmitting the disease to one of its healthy neighbors.
Example 2 (Political polarization) Players want to differen-
tiate their actions from those with opposing beliefs [24]. The
network represents the social interactions among players in
opposing beliefs (S0 and S1). Action 1 represents a monetary
3choice or support for a cause that is individually desirable in
the absence of partisanship. A player’s tendency to take the
preferred action (action 1) reduces as it has more neighbors
that take action 1. That is, a player can opt-out from individual
benefits or societal impact to express partisan preferences.
Constants c0 and c1 capture the inclination of players in
beliefs 0 and 1 to differentiate themselves from the players
in the opposing belief, respectively.
Example 3 (Hawk-Dove network game) Two competing
species (S0 and S1) face-off in an ecological environment.
At each interaction players decide to be hawkish (ai = 1)
or dovish (ai = 0). A hawk move gets the highest reward
if its neighboring competitors play dove. If both interacting
players play dove, they miss the opportunity to overcome
their competitor. If both interacting players are hawkish, they
challenge each other and face costs. The constants c0 and c1
represent the costs species 0 and 1 incur, respectively, when
they act hawkish against a hawkish competitor.
III. DECENTRALIZED LEARNING DYNAMICS
Players repeatedly play the anti-coordination network game
{N ,A,GB , {ui}i∈N } taking actions aki ∈ Ai at each stage
k. We assume each player knows its own type. Players
take actions according to a decentralized algorithm details
described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 starts with each player selecting an arbitrary
action  ∈ (0, 1) not equal to zero or one. Player i checks
the worst and best possible outcomes in equations (2)-(3),
respectively. In (2), player i checks whether it is preferable
to select ai = 1 according to its utility (1) even when its
undecided neighbors ({j ∈ Ni : aj,k−1 = }) end up taking
action 1. That is, the ceiling operator makes a worst case
scenario assumption (all undecided neighbors take action 1)
and evaluates its utility from action 1. In (3), player i checks
whether it is preferable to select ai = 0 according to its utility
(1) when its undecided neighbors ({j ∈ Ni : aj,k−1 = }) end
up taking action 0. That is, the floor operator makes a best case
scenario assumption (all undecided neighbors taking action 0)
and evaluates ai = 0 according to (1). Note that the ceil and
floor operators do not affect the decided neighbors of a player,
i.e., neighboring players whose previous action are 0 or 1. If
(2)-(3) do not hold at step k, player i remains “undecided”,
i.e., aki = .
Algorithm 1 (Local learning algorithm)
Initialize: a0i =  for all i ∈ N
for k = 1, 2, . . .
Observe ak−1Ni
aki = 1 if 1 > (c0(1− si) + c1si)
∑
j∈Ni
⌈
ak−1j
⌉
(2)
aki = 0 if 1 < (c0(1− si) + c1si)
∑
j∈Ni
⌊
ak−1j
⌋
(3)
aki = , otherwise
end
end
The local algorithm takes as input an initial action profile a0,
and outputs an infinite sequence of action profiles. We denote
the mapping of Algorithm 1 as
Φ(a0) ≡ (a0, a1, . . .)
where at := (at1, . . . , a
t
n), We will use the notation
Φk(a
0) ≡ ak (4)
to denote the resulting action profile after k iterations of the
local algorithm.
Figure 2 shows the iterations of Algorithm 1 on a 7
player network for different payoff constants. We observe that
depending on the payoff constants c0, c1, the algorithm might
yield an action profile where all players are decided, all remain
undecided, or some are decided and some remain undecided.
In all cases, the algorithm converges in at most k = 3 steps.
Indeed, the algorithm will only require at most n updates
to converge where we recall n as the number of players.
Additional number of iterates is not needed because once a
player decides on action 0 or 1, they do not revert. Further, if
no player updates at a given step, then it implies there cannot
be any updates in the future steps. This means some players
can remain undecided. We present the convergence properties
of Algorithm 1 in the following section.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF THE LOCAL LEARNING ALGORITHM
A. Game theoretic preliminaries
We define the rational action by the Nash equilibrium
solution concept. A Nash equilibrium (NE) action profile
aNE ∈ [0, 1]n is such that no individual has a preferable
deviation from its action, that is,
ui(a
NE
i , a
NE
Ni) ≥ ui(ai, aNENi) ai ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N (5)
where aNENi := {aNEj : j ∈ Ni}. In other words, the individuals
respond to the NE actions of other individuals to maximize
their payoffs. For a given neighbor action profile aNi we have
the best response of individual i as follows,
BRi(aNi) := argmax
ai∈[0,1]
ui(ai, aNi)
= 1
1 > (c0(1− si) + c1si) ∑
j∈Ni
aj
 (6)
where 1(·) is an indicator function. Since the payoffs are linear
in self-actions, the actions that maximize the payoffs are in
the extremes—ai = 1 or ai = 0—depending on the types and
actions of their neighbors. We can equivalently represent the
NE definition in (5) by using the best response definition,
aNEi = BRi(a
NE
Ni) for all i ∈ N . (7)
The notion of strictly dominated is defined as follows.
4Fig. 2. Algorithm 1’s convergence with respect to different payoff constants (A, B, C) on a 7 player network. Initially, all players are undecided ai,0 = .
(A) At step k = 1, players 1, 3, and 4 update their actions to 1 by (2) given 1 > c0, players 5 and 6 also update their action to 1 by (2) given 1 > 2c1,
and players 2 and 7 remain undecided. At step k = 2, player 2 observes previous actions of its neighbors—{a5,1, a6,1}—and updates its action to 0 by (3)
given 2c0 > 1. At step k = 3, player 7 observes player 2’s update—a2,2 = 0—and updates its action to 1 by (2) given 1 > 2c1. All players are decided,
and the action profile is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. (B) All players remain undecided for all times because no player can eliminate any action
by (2). (C) At step k = 1, players 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 update to action 1 similar to case (A). At step k = 2, neither player 2 nor player 1 can eliminate any
actions, and both remain undecided. A subset of players are decided while the others remain undecided.
Definition 1 (Strictly dominated action) An action ai ∈
[0, 1] is strictly dominated if and only if there exists an action
a′i ∈ [0, 1] such that
ui(a
′
i, aNi) > ui(ai, aNi) for all aNi ∈ ANi (8)
If an action ai is strictly dominated then there exists a more
preferable action a′i for any circumstance. It is clear that if an
action is strictly dominated then it cannot be a rational action
from (7).
In a game we can iteratively remove the strictly dominated
actions, this process is called the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies and is defined below.
Definition 2 (Iterated elimination) Set the initial set of ac-
tions A0i = [0, 1] for all i, and for any k ∈ N let
Aki = {ai ∈Ak−1i
∣∣
ai is not strictly dominated by any aNi ∈ Ak−1Ni }
We denote the set of player i’s actions that survive the iterated
elimination by A∞i :=
⋂∞
k=0A
k
i . When A
∞
i has a single
element, we say A∞i is a singleton. If A
∞
i is a singleton for all
i ∈ N , then the game is dominance solvable, and has a unique
Nash equilibrium given by the action profile that survives the
iterated elimination process.
B. Convergence
The following theorem states that Algorithm 1 eliminates
all strictly dominated actions in finite number of steps.
Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 converges in at most n iterations,
that is, no player changes its action after the nth update. At
the end of n iterations, if all players are decided, i.e., ani =
{0, 1} for all i ∈ N , then all the other actions Ai \ ani are
strictly dominated and the resultant action profile is a Nash
equilibrium. Otherwise, if a player i ∈ N is undecided, i.e.,
ani = , then there does not exist ai ∈ Ai that can be strictly
dominated.
The proof of the theorem is given in the appendix. It relies
on showing that Algorithm 1 is a decentralized version of the
iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions as given by
Definition 2. The intuition for n step convergence is that at
each step at least one player needs to eliminate its action using
(2) or (3). If no player updates at a time step, the players stop
updating because no new eliminations are triggered from then
on. Therefore, there could at most be n iterations to rule out
n players one player at a time.
V. MAXIMUM ANTI-COORDINATION PROBLEM
We say the edge between players (i, j) ∈ EB is inac-
tive if aiaj = 0, with ai, aj ∈ {0, 1}. We have maxi-
mum anti-coordination when all edges are inactive, that is,∑
(i,j)∈EB aiaj = 0 with ai, aj ∈ {0, 1}. The learning
dynamics (Algorithm 1) does not guarantee that the resulting
action profile satisfies maximum anti-coordination. Hence, to
ensure maximum anti-coordination, it is necessary to exter-
nally control players’ decisions. To this end, we formulate
the minimum player control for maximum anti-coordination
(MPCAC) optimization problem.
5Before we define the optimization problems, we define a
controlled action profile trajectory in lieu of Algorithm 1. A
control profile is an infinite sequence of subsets of players:
X = {X 0,X 1, . . .} with X t ⊆ N for all t ≥ 0. We say
xti = 1 if player i ∈ X t, and xti = 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
we denote δti ∈ {0, 1} as the forced action of player i at time
t ≥ 0 if i ∈ X t. For convention, and without loss of generality,
we say δti = 0 if i /∈ X t. We write ∆ ≡ (δ0, δ1, . . .) for the
sequence of forced action profiles. With the control profile X ,
the resulting action profile trajectory, with intial action profile
y0 is written
Φ(y0,X ,∆) := (a0, a1, . . .) (9)
where the at obey the following dynamics for t = 0, 1, . . .
ati = (1− xti)yti + xtiδti , for all i ∈ N
yt+1 = Φ1(a
t).
(10)
Note Φ1(at) is the uncontrolled action at time t + 1 by (4)
given the controlled action profile at at time t. We will refer
to the pair (X ,∆) as a control policy. In the first formulation
of the maximum anti-coordination optimal control problem,
we seek to achieve maximum anti-coordination using as few
fixed control players as possible. It is formalized as follows.
Definition 3 (Static MPCAC)
min
Xs⊂N
δi∈{0,1},i∈Xs
Js(Xs, δ) := |Xs| (11)
s.t.
ani + a
n
j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ EB
ani ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N
X = {Xs,Xs, . . .}
δti = δi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Xs, for all t ≥ 0
(a0, a1, . . .) = Φ(~,X ,∆), where ~ = 1n
The objective in (11) is to minimize the cardinality of the
set Xs, that is, the number of players controlled. The first
and second constraints together make sure of maximum anti-
coordination at time n when all players must be decided, i.e.,
they are equivalent to the constraint
∑
(i,j)∈EB aiaj = 0 with
ani ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N . The third and fourth constraints
define the controlled players and their actions for all times.
The third constraint selects forced actions in the control set.
The last constraint states the controlled learning dynamics (9)
that govern players’ decision-making.
The optimization problem (11) runs for n time steps to
allow for convergence of Algorithm 1 because if the algorithm
dynamics are going to generate an anti-coordinating action
pair, we would want to make use of it instead of incurring
the cost for controlling a player. Selecting a player to the
controlled set and changing its action via δi does not increase
the convergence time of the algorithm, hence we stop the
optimization after n steps. Indeed, if we control a set of players
Xs at t = 0, by Theorem 1 the algorithm converges in n−|Xs|
steps. Hence, the optimization horizon of n steps is sufficient
to make full use of learning dynamics.
The following result uses the convergence in finite time of
the iterated elimination process to show that any static policy
that satisfies the maximum anti-coordination constraint at time
n will continue to satisfy it for t > n.
Lemma 1 If Πs = (Xs,∆s) is a static control policy such
that ani + a
n
j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ EB , then no player will
change its decision, that is, ati + a
t
j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ EB ,
t > n.
Proof : A control profile Xs with actions δi = {0, 1} is
feasible if all players decide by time n. Given a feasible
static control policy (Xs,∆), define the game Γ′ among
players N \ Xs where players connected to Xs have a set of
decided neighbors according to forced action profile ∆. The
game Γ′ must be dominance solvable so that Algorithm 1
converges by time n. Thus if we continue to apply the forced
actions ∆, no player would change its decision after time n. 
In static MPCAC, we decide on players to control at the
beginning and set their actions for the entire horizon. The
objective only accounts for the number of players controlled
but not the number of times we control a player. In many
situations it may be enough to control a player for a finite
time to achieve maximum anti-coordination. For instance, in
case (B) in Fig 2, if we set the actions of players 5-7 to 0 for
one time step, the remaining players (1-4) will take action 1
by (2). If we stop controlling the players 5-7 in the next time
step, they will continue to take action 0 by (3). Hence, the
resultant action profile will achieve maximal anti-coordination.
Next we formulate the dynamic MPCAC problem that allows
for dynamic selection of players to control, and accounts for
the number of times we control each player.
Definition 4 (Dynamic MPCAC)
min
X ,∆
Jd(X ,∆) := 1
n
n∑
t=1
|X t|+ lim
T ′→∞
1
T ′
T ′∑
t=n+1
|X t| (12)
s.t.
ati + a
t
j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ EB , t ≥ n
ati ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , t ≥ n
(a0, a1, . . .) = Φ(~,X ,∆)
The two terms in the penalty function in (12) equally weight
the control effort per player before convergence and after con-
vergence to maximum anti-coordination. In dynamic MPCAC,
we allow for the set of controlled players and their actions
to change at each step. Lemma 1 does not necessarily apply
in the dynamic setting. Hence, we explicitly require that the
maximum anti-coordination is maintained for all times after
n in the first two constraints. The last constraint specifies the
controlled learning dynamics (9).
The following result shows that an optimal policy for
dynamic MPCAC should at least be as good as an optimal
policy for static MPCAC.
6Lemma 2 Let Πs = (X ∗s , δ∗) and Πd = (X∗,∆∗) be optimal
policies for static and dynamic MPCAC, respectively. Then
Jd(Πd) ≤ 2Js(Πs) = 2|X ∗s |.
Proof : Suppose there exists an optimal dynamic policy Πd
such that Jd(Πd) > 2|X ∗s |. Then we can implement (Πs)t≥0
to achieve a cost of 2|X ∗s | in dynamic MPCAC, where the first
and second terms in the objective 12 will be |X ∗s |. By Lemma
1, Πs will satisfy the constraints in dynamic MPCAC which
means it is also a feasible solution for the dynamic MPCAC.
Hence, Πd cannot be optimal. 
This result is expected when we observe that any static policy
that is feasible for the static MPCAC is also feasible for the
dynamic MPCAC by Lemma 1. Hence, we can always use the
optimal solution for static MPCAC to upper bound the penalty
in the dynamic MPCAC. In fact, if the static MPCAC solution
reaches an action profile that is an equilibrium of the game by
time n, then the optimal solution is upper bounded by |X ∗s |.
That is, we do not need to make any control efforts to remain
at the maximum anti-coordination action profile because the
action profile is also an equilibrium of the game.
The first constraint of dynamic MPCAC requires maximum
anti-coordination after time n, whether or not control actions
are used to keep it in equilibrium. This together with the
penalization of control efforts for all times after n gives
preference to control policy solutions, when feasible, that
leverage the controlled dynamics Φ in (9) in order to achieve
maximum anti-coordination. The following result supports this
intuition for dominance solvable games.
Lemma 3 If the game is dominance solvable, the optimal
policy for dynamic MPCAC (Πd = (X∗,∆∗)) is either X t∗ = ∅
for all t = 1, 2, . . . or X t∗ 6= ∅ for t ≥ n.
The above result proven in the Appendix shows that if Al-
gorithm 1 converges to a single action profile, then either no
control effort is required or the control effort after convergence
(t > n) is non-zero. This result relies on whether the unique
Nash equilibrium achieves maximum anti-coordination or not,
which then corresponds to an empty control profile or a non-
empty control profile for t > n, respectively. In general, if
the game {N ,A,GB , {ui}i∈N }, not necessarily dominance
solvable, has Nash equilibria that achieve maximum anti-
coordination, we would expect control policies that induce
convergence to such Nash equilibria over policies that control
players after time n in order to avoid the second term in the
objective of dynamic MPCAC. We formalize this intuition in
the following lemma (see appendix for the proof).
Lemma 4 If there exists a set of Nash equilibria that achieves
maximal anti-coordination, then the optimal solution to dy-
namic MPCAC will reach an action profile in this set.
Next we relate the dynamic MPCAC problem to a vertex
covering problem on a bipartite network. We define the graph
with potential dangerous links after Algorithm 1 converges at
time n as follows. Let Gn = (Nn, En) be the graph with
vertices composed of players that remain undecided or take
1
an1 = 1
2
an2 = 1
3
an3 = 1
4
an4 = 0
5
an5 = 0
6
an6 = 1
7
an7 = 1
8
an8 = 1
Fig. 3. Assume c0 = 0.4 and c1 = 0.4. The game is dominance solvable
and Algorithm 1 converges to the above action profile with only active link
between 3 and 6. That is, Nn = {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8} and En = {(3, 6)}. The
solution to (13) if we disregard the last constraint is either x∗3 = 1 or x
∗
6 = 1.
These solutions violate the last constraint for players 5 or 4. If we fix ρi = 0
for i ∈ {5, 4}, then (13) is infeasible.
action 1 after Algorithm 1 converges at step n, i.e., Nn :=
{j ∈ N : anj = {, 1}}, and with edges that connect players
in Nn in EB , that is, En = {(i, j) ∈ EB : i ∈ Nn, j ∈ Nn}.
For example, in Fig. 2 case (A), the network Gn has the vertex
set Nn = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
A cardinality vertex cover for the graph Gn = (Nn, En)
looks for a minimum cardinality subset of vertices Xn ⊆ Nn
such that each edge has at least one endpoint incident at
Xn [27]. Given the action profile at time n, an, we consider
the following modified cardinality vertex cover problem with
tuning parameter λ ≥ 0,
min
x,ρ≥0
∑
i∈Nn
xi + λ
∑
i∈N\Nn
|ρi| (13)
s.t. xi + xj ≥ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ En
xi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Nn
ci
∑
j∈Nk
(danj e − xj) ≥ 1− ρi for all k /∈ Nn
where ci := c0(1− si) + c1si is player i’s payoff constant. If
the second term in the objective and the last constraint are
excluded, the problem formulation would be the minimum
vertex covering problem in the bipartite network Gn. If we
set ρi = 0 for players i ∈ N \ Nn, the last constraint makes
sure that we select the players in the vertex covering such
that the players in N \ Nn who are decided on action 0 do
not change their actions as a result of the control efforts. In
general, the last constraint with ρi = 0 can make the vertex
covering problem infeasible—see Figure 3 for an example.
Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n), and ρ = (ρ
∗
1, . . . , ρ
∗
n) be an optimal
solution to (13). We construct a feasible control policy Πv =
{X ,∆} as follows. Let X t = ∅ if t < n. Define the controlled
player set Xn and their actions ∆n at time n based on the
optimal solution of the above problem as follows,
Xn = {i ∈ Nn : x∗i = 1}
⋃
{i ∈ Nn : x∗i = 0, ani = },
(14)
and
δni =
{
0 for all i ∈ {i ∈ Nn : x∗i = 1}
1 for all i ∈ {i ∈ Nn : x∗i = 0, ani = }.
(15)
For t = n + 1, we define the controlled player set Xn+1
and their actions ∆n+1 as follows,
Xn+1 = {i ∈ Nn : x∗i = 1}
⋃
{i /∈ Nn : ρ∗i > 0}, (16)
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δn+1i = 0 for all i ∈ Xn+1. (17)
For t ≥ n + 1, we let X t = Xn+1 if the action profile
{an+1i , δn+1i }i∈N is not a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Otherwise, X t = ∅ for t > n.
Theorem 2 The dynamic control policy Πv = {X ,∆} with
control and action sets at time n given by (14)-(15) and for
time t ≥ n+ 1 given by (16)-(17) is a feasible dynamic policy
for the dynamic MPCAC problem in (12).
Proof: Given (14)-(15), the controlled action profile at time
n is given by (10),
ani =
{
1− x∗i if i ∈ Nn
0 o.w.
(18)
Given the definition of Gn and ∆n, we have the controlled
actions an satisfy ani + a
n
j ≤ 1 for any (i, j) ∈ En, since we
force at least one player in every link of Gn to play action 0.
This means that at time n anti-coordination is achieved by an.
Further, all players are decided satisfying the second constraint
in (12).
Next, we show Xn+1,∆n+1 maintains anti-coordination
with the controlled action profile an+1.
Consider the following set partition of Nn,
Nn = {i ∈ N : yni = 1}
∪ {i ∈ N : yni = , x∗i = 1}
∪ {i ∈ N : yni = , x∗i = 0}, (19)
where yn is the uncontrolled action profile at time n. For the
first two set of players in (19), we have an+1i = 1 − x∗i by
(16). The last set of players were controlled to play action 1.
At time n, they have no neighbors that take action 1 in (15). So
they continue to take action 1 using the update (2) even when
they are not controlled any longer. Hence, yn+1i = 1− x∗i for
{i ∈ N : ani = , x∗i = 0}. This implies that an+1i = 1 − x∗i
for all i ∈ Nn.
Next, consider the following partition of the set of players
not belonging to Nn,
N\Nn = {i ∈ N \ Nn : ani = 0, ci
∑
j∈Ni
(danj e − x∗j ) < 1}
∪ {i ∈ N \ Nn : ani = 0, ci
∑
j∈Ni
(danj e − x∗j ) > 1} (20)
Note that all the players in the first set in (20) are controlled to
play action 0 in (16), that is, an+1i = 0 because {i ∈ N \Nn :
ani = 0, ci
∑
j∈Ni(danj e − x∗j ) < 1} = {i /∈ Nn : ρ∗i > 0}
by the last constraint in (13). For the second set in (20), all
players continue to select action 0 by (3). This implies that
an+1i = 0 for i /∈ Nn.
Combining the two arguments, we have an+1i = a
n
i where
ani is given in (18). Hence, the controlled action profile at
time n + 1 achieves anti-coordination. Suppose, an+1 is a
Nash equilibrium action profile, then an+1 = Φ1(an+1) and
no further control effort is necessary. Otherwise, we have
yn+2 = Φ1(a
n+1) = Φ1(a
n) = yn+1 where yn+1 and yn+2
are the uncontrolled action profiles at time n + 1 and n + 2,
respectively. Since, X t = Xn+1, ∆t = ∆n+1 for t ≥ n + 1,
we have that an+2 = an+1. By induction, the control policy
Πv satisfies anti-coordination. 
The proof relies on showing that a minimum vertex cover
will eliminate all possible risky interactions after Algorithm
1 possibly eliminates a subset of them. The optimization
formulation in (13) makes sure that there are no changes to
the players decided on action 0 by time n. The minimum
vertex cover solution Xn and forced actions δni = 0 for all
i ∈ Xn makes sure that the first two constraints in dynamic
MPCAC are satisfied. The policy after time n makes sure that
all players continue to take the same actions for time t > n
hence satisfying the first two constraints for all t > n.
Theorem 2 shows that the MPCAC problems can be upper
bounded by solving the minimum vertex cover on the reduced
bipartite graph Gn. Further, if we set the tuning parameter
λ = 0, then the integer program in (13) has an exact linear
programming relaxation due to total unimodularity of bipartite
networks [28, Ch. 3]. Hence, we can obtain a feasible policy
efficiently by solving (13) with penalty term λ = 0. Then,
including all players that have positive ρi in the control set
({i /∈ Nn : ρ∗i > 0}). The following corollary presents a
scenario in which Πv optimal.
Corollary 1 The policy Πv defined in Theorem 2 is an optimal
policy if all players eliminate their actions in one time step in
Algorithm 1.
The proof given in the appendix relies on showing that when
all players eliminate their actions, the optimization problem in
(13) reduces to solving the minimum cardinality vertex cover
for the entire network G. This case happens only when ci is
smaller than inverse of the maximum degree of the network
(ci|Ni| < 1 for all i ∈ N ). The control policy Πv is an upper
bound in general because it does not make use of cascades,
i.e., use the learning dynamics to make multiple hop links
inactive, by controlling a subset of players. Instead, it waits
for the algorithm to eliminate as many active links as possible,
and then makes a two time-step control of players. As we show
in numerical examples in Section VIII, the policy Πv tends to
perform well when c0 is small and c1 is large, or when c0
is large and c1 is small. In the following section, we present
optimal policies for benchmark networks that exemplify the
optimal use of cascades to eliminate active links.
VI. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR BENCHMARK NETWORKS
We consider star, line and ring networks, and provide opti-
mal solutions for both static and dynamic MPCAC problems.
A. Star network
Consider a star network of n players with player 1 in the
center. Without loss of generality we assume center node is
type 1, i.e., s1 = 1 and the rest are type 0, i.e., j ∈ S0 for
j ∈ N \ {1}—see Figure 4.
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Fig. 4. Star, line, and ring benchmark networks for 4 player networks.
Proposition 1 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to static MPCAC follows.
a) If 1 > c0 and 1 > c1(n− 1), then X = {1} with δ1 = 0.
b) If 1 < c0 and 1 > c1(n−1), or 1 > c0 and 1 < c1(n−1),
then X = ∅.
(c) If 1 < c0 and 1 < c1(n − 1), then X = {1} with either
δ1 = 0 or 1.
Proof: In a star network, if 1 > c1(n− 1) or 1 > c0, then the
center or the fringe players have all actions strictly dominated
by action 1 via (2). If 1 < c0, then a fringe player eliminates
all actions except 0 via (3) when the center node takes action
1. If 1 < c1(n−1), then the center player eliminates all actions
except 0 via (3) when the fringe nodes take action 1. Based on
this, in case (a), the algorithm converges to an action profile
where all players take action 1. In order to achieve maximum
anti-coordination, we select center player to play action 0. In
case (b) the algorithm converges in 2 steps to a maximum
anti-coordination action profile, i.e., {a1 = 1, a−1 = 0} or
{a1 = 0, a−1 = 1}. In case (c), there is no action that is
strictly dominated if we do not control a player. Hence, we
control center player to take action 0, i.e., X = {1}. Then, all
fringe players eliminate all actions except action 1. 
Above result addresses the three cases that can arise in a star
network: (a) all players make decisions using the algorithm
but the resultant action profile does not achieve maximum
anti-coordination; (b) all players make decisions using the
algorithm and the resultant action profile achieves maximum
anti-coordination; (c) all players remain undecided using the
algorithm. In case (a), we have to cause anti-coordination by
controlling the center player. In case (b), we do not have to
control any player. In case (c), we control the center player to
trigger a decision for the fringe players.
For the dynamic MPCAC, we need to specify the set of
nodes controlled at each time step denoted by X t. We provide
optimal policies for dynamic MPCAC problem on a star
network.
Proposition 2 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to dynamic MPCAC follows.
(a) If 1 > c0 and 1 > c1(n− 1), then{
X t = ∅, if t < n
X t = {1}, δt1 = 0 if t ≥ n
The resulting optimal cost is C∗ = 1.
(b) If 1 < c0 and 1 > c1(n−1), or 1 > c0 and 1 < c1(n−1),
then X t = ∅ for all t. The resulting optimal cost is
C∗ = 0.
(c) If 1 < c0 and 1 < c1(n− 1), then X 1 = {1}.{
X t = {1}, δt1 = 0 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
The resulting optimal cost is C∗ = 2/n.
Proof: In cases (a) and (b), the game is dominance solvable.
Further, the algorithm converges in t ≤ 2 steps. Lemma 3
together with Lemma 2 gives the optimal policies for the first
two cases.
In case (c), the game is not dominance solvable and
there exists two Nash equilibria that achieve maximum anti-
coordination: (a1 = 0, {ai = 1}i6=1) and (a1 = 1, {ai =
0}i6=1). By Lemma 4, the optimal policy will induce the
dynamics to converge to one of these configurations. Either
of these equilibria can be achieved through a dynamic policy
that targets only the center node for a single time step, which
gives the optimal cost 1/n. For instance, we set the center
player’s action to 0 at time t = 0 so that fringe players select
ai = 1 at t = 1. We hold this control at t = 1 as well, so that
the center node will consolidate its unforced action to 0 by
(3). We lift the control at t = 2 and for all times thereafter,
in which the players are in equilibrium and maximum anti-
coordination is achieved. This policy is optimal because there
cannot be a policy that achieves a smaller objective value than
2/n and achieve maximum anti-coordination. 
The optimal action profile and its proof are similar to the
static case. There are two significant differences between the
dynamic and static problem. If the algorithm converges to
an action profile in which some neighboring pairs of players
end up taking action 1, e.g., case (a), then we have to anti-
coordinate the corresponding links by controlling one of the
players at the end of the time horizon n. If the algorithm
is going to converge to an action profile where we will
have undecided neighboring players (case (c)), we can make
these players anti-coordinate by initially controlling one of the
neighbors temporarily for two time steps. In case (a), we incur
a cost of 1 because if we lift our control of the center player,
it will always revert back to a1 = 1. In contrast, in case (c),
we only need to control the player 1 for two steps, because it
will not revert to a1 = 1 by the time its neighbors are taking
action 1.
B. Line network
We consider a line network in which the neighborhood of
player i ∈ N \ {1, n} is given by Ni = {i − 1, i + 1}. The
players at the endpoints have neighbor sets N1 = {2},Nn =
{n−1}. The type configuration alternates between types 0 and
91: i ∈ S0 for i odd, and i ∈ S1 for i even. We will also refer
to the subsets Soddm ,Sevenm for m ∈ {0, 1} to denote every odd
(even) player from the set Sm along the line. In the following
analysis, we consider six payoff constant cases that ensure an
exhaustive analysis for the line, and in the next section, the
ring network. First, we consider an odd number of players on
the line network.
Proposition 3 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal control set for the static MPCAC problem for a
line network with n odd is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1, then X = S1, |X | = bn/2c, and
δS1 = 0.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X = ∅.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, then X = ∅.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X =
Seven1 , {δi}i∈X = 0, and |X | = bn/4c.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then |X | = 1 where X is
any one player i, with δi = 0 (1) if i ∈ S0 (S1).
f) If c0 > 1 and c1 > 1, then |X | = d(n − 1)/4e, where
X = Seven0 , with δX = 1.
Proof:
a) The game is dominance solvable with the unique Nash
equilibrium ai = 1 for all i ∈ N . The minimum vertex
cover is X = S1, and forcing action 0 induces the
solution.
b) The game is dominance solvable with the unique Nash
equilibrium aS0 = 1, aS1 = 0.
c) Same proof as (b).
d) Consider controlling S1 players spaced three nodes apart
along the line with action 0. These consist of the even-
indexed S1 players. In two time steps, the nodes in
between will converge to the equilibrium action induc-
ing maximum anti-coordination. The smallest number
of nodes to control in this manner is bn/4c. Sparser
placement of control results in undecided players.
e) If X selects a single i ∈ S1 to play ai = 1, its S0
neighbors decide on action 0 (1 < c0). At the next
iteration, the next S1 players will decide on action 1
(1 > c1). This cascades down the entire line, resulting
in maximum anti-coordination. The same holds if X
selected a single i ∈ S0 to play ai = 0.
f) In a similar manner as case (d), X can be chosen to be
every other S0 player along the line network, forcing with
action 1 to cause two-hop cascades along the network in
two time steps.

Proposition 4 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal control policy ({X t},∆) for the dynamic MPCAC
problem on a line network with n odd is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1, then{
X t = ∅ if t < n
X t = S1, {δti}i∈S = 0 if t ≥ n
which gives the optimal cost C∗ = bn/2c.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X t = ∅ for all t ≥ 0.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, then X t = ∅ for all t ≥ 0.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then{
X t = Seven1 , δtX t = 0 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
which gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2bn/4c/n.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then{
X t = {i}, δti = si if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
for any i ∈ N . This gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2/n.
f) Suppose c0 > 1 and c1 > 1. Then{
X t = Seven0 , δtX t = 1 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2d(n− 1)/4e/n.
Proof:
a) The game is dominance solvable, and converges at t = 1
to a = (1, . . . , 1). By Lemma 2, the optimal policy selects
the minimum vertex cover of the line graph after the n
time-step horizon.
b) The game is dominance solvable, and converges at t = 2
to the unique Nash equilibrium a s.t. ai = 1 for all i ∈ S0
and ai = 0 for all i ∈ S1, achieving maximum anti-
coordination. Lemma 3 asserts the optimal policy is the
empty set.
c) Same proof as (b).
d) The action profile aS0 = 1, aS1 = 0 is the only Nash
equilibrium achieving maximum anti-coordination. By
Lemma 4, the optimal policy induces convergence to
this equilibrium by t = n. Only the endpoint players
{1, n} ∈ S0 have action 1 as a dominant strategy
(1 > c0), and all other players will remain undecided
in the absence of control. Hence, the policy that gives
convergence to a with minimal cost selects every even
S1 players to play 0 for two time steps, given in the
Proposition statement d).
e) The game is not dominance solvable, but there are two
Nash equilibria a∗, aˆ giving maximum anti-coordination,
where (a∗S0 = 0, a
∗
S1 = 1) and (aˆS0 = 1, aˆS1 = 0).
By Lemma 4, the optimal policy induces convergence to
one of these equilibria by t = n. One can check that
a dynamic policy incurring total cost 2/n (controlling a
single node for two time-steps) induces convergence to
a∗, and any dynamic policy inducing convergence to aˆ
has cost strictly greater than 2/n because a player in
i ∈ S1 needs at−1i−1 = at−1i+1 = 1 in order to play the
equilibrium action ati = 0 (due to 1 < 2c1). Such a
convergence would require controlling more than a single
node for two time steps.
f) The two Nash equilibria a∗, aˆ give maximum anti-
coordination, so by Lemma 4, one of these are selected
in optimality. Selecting aˆ gives the minimal cost when
every odd S0 player is controlled with action 1 for two
time-steps, which causes the players in between these
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selections to decide on the equilibrium actions. Similarly,
selecting a∗ also gives the minimal cost when every odd
S1 player, including the last one, is controlled with action
1 for two time-steps.

When considering even number of players n in the line
network, we obtain similar results. For brevity, we present
the results but omit the proofs because they follow similar
arguments as Proposition 4. Here, the type configuration in
the network also alternates s.t. i ∈ S0 if i is odd, and si ∈ S1
if i is even.
Proposition 5 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to static MPCAC for a line network with
n even is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1, then X = S0 or S1 with δX = 0.
Then, |X | = n/2.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X = {n} with δn = 0.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, then X = ∅.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X = Sodd1 with
δX = 0. Then |X | = dn/4e.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then X = ∅.
f) If c0 > 1 and c1 > 1, then X = Sodd1 with δX = 1. Then
|X | = dn/4e.
Proposition 6 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to the dynamic MPCAC problem for a
line network with n even is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1, then{
X t = ∅ if t < n
X t = S0 or S1, {δti}i∈S = 0 if t ≥ n
which gives the optimal cost C∗ = n/2.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then{
X t = ∅ if t < n
X t = {n}, δtn = 0 if t ≥ n
which gives the optimal cost C∗ = 1.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, then X t = ∅ for all t ≥ 0.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then{
X t = Sodd1 ∪ {n}, δtX t = 0 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
which gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2dn/4e/n.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, then{
X t = {i}, δti = si if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
for any i ∈ N . This gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2/n.
f) Suppose c0 > 1 and c1 > 1. Then{
X t = Sodd1 , δtX t = 1 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2dn/4e/n.
C. Ring network
Here, we consider a ring network with alternating type
configuration and where n is even. For convention, we index
the players in the same fashion as the line network above, and
alternate types between S0,S1 - i.e., odd (even) indices are
S0 (S1) players.
Proposition 7 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to static MPCAC for a ring network with
n even is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1, X = S0 or S1, and |X | = n/2.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, X = ∅.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, X = ∅.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, X = Sodd0 or Sodd1
with δX = 1. Then, |X | = dn/4e.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, X = {i} with δi = si for
any i ∈ N . Then |X | = 1.
f) If c0 > 1 and c1 > 1, either X = Sodd0 or X = Sodd1 with
δX = 1. Then |X | = dn/4e.
Proof:
a) The game is dominance solvable with all nodes playing
action 1. Hence, influence of either all type-0 or type-1
nodes gives the solution.
b) The game is dominance solvable, which converges to
maximum anti-coordination (type-0 playing 1, type-1
playing 0) without influencing any nodes.
c) Same argument as (b).
d) The learning algorithm produces no decided nodes. Con-
trolling a single node to play 0 results in the algorithm
converging in the next iteration, with its two neighbors
playing 1. Hence, by controlling every other node of one
type (every 4 along the ring) to play 0, the algorithm will
converge to maximum anti-coordination in two iterations.
e) The algorithm produces no decided nodes. If a single
type-0 node is forced to play 0, decisions will be cascaded
along the ring resulting in maximum anti-coordination.
Similarly, one could influence a single type-1 node to
play 1.
f) Same argument as (d).

Proposition 8 Depending on the utility constants c0 and c1,
the optimal solutions to dynamic MPCAC for a ring network
with n even is
a) If 1 > 2c0 and 1 > 2c1{
X t = ∅ if t < n
X t = S0 or S1, {δti}i∈S = 0 if t ≥ n
The resulting optimal cost is C∗ = n/2.
b) If 1 > 2c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1, X t = ∅ for all t ≥ 0.
c) If 1 > 2c0 and c1 > 1, X t = ∅ for all t ≥ 0.
d) If 2c0 > 1 > c0 and 2c1 > 1 > c1,{
X t = Sodd1 , δtX t = 1 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
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The resulting optimal cost is C∗ = 2dn/4e/n.
e) If c0 > 1 and 2c1 > 1 > c1,{
X t = {i}, δti = si if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
The resulting optimal cost is C∗ = 2/n.
f) If c0 > 1 and c1 > 1, then either{
X t = Sodd0 , δtX t = 1 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
or {
X t = Sodd1 , δtX t = 1 if t = 0, 1
X t = ∅ if t > 1
gives the optimal cost C∗ = 2dn/4e/n.
Proof: We omit the details of the proof for brevity. The proof
utilizes similar arguments from Proposition 4 by invoking
Lemmas 3, 4, and 2, as well as the structural arguments from
the proof of Proposition 7. 
D. Discussion
The optimal control policies vary depending on the payoff
constants. If all players decide to play action 1 as a result of
the learning process, then we solve a minimum vertex covering
problem along the lines of Lemma 2, and the players selected
have to be controlled for all times t ≥ n—case (a) in all of the
propositions in this section. If the game is dominance solvable
and there are no active anti-coordination links in the equilib-
rium action profile, the optimal policy is the empty set—see
Propositions 1(b), 2(b), 3(b,c), 4(b,c), 5(b,c) 6(b,c), 7(b,c), and
8. If a subset of players remain undecided as a result of the
learning algorithm and there are no failed anti-coordination
links between the decided players, an optimal policy can be
found by leveraging Lemma 4. In the benchmark examples,
these policies required controlling a subset of the players,
causing the undecided players in the other type to decide. In
dynamic MPCAC cases, this subset needed to be controlled
for two time steps. The neighboring players will decide on
actions after the first time step, and the controlled players
use their neighbors’ decisions to consolidate their (unforced)
actions in the second time step. Thus, the control can be
lifted and no player will revert from their decided actions. The
resultant action profile is a Nash equilibrium action profile that
satisfies maximum anti-coordination. Hence, there is no need
to make control efforts after time n. Consequently, we can
control a smaller subset of players and leverage the learning
dynamics to create cascades of decision-making—see cases
(d-f) in Propositions 3 - 8. In the latter scenarios, the policy
suggested by Lemma 2 is an upper bound of the optimal policy.
VII. SUBOPTIMAL ALGORITHMS FOR GENERAL
NETWORKS
For general bipartite network topologies and for arbitrary
network size, it becomes challenging to solve precisely for
the MPCAC solutions (both static and dynamic). We devise
an algorithm that selects at each iteration one player to control
according to a greedy approach. The algorithm results in
a subset of control agents Xˆ that ensures maximum anti-
coordination, but may not be the optimal MPCAC solution.
Given a network game {N ,A,GB , {ui}i∈N }, we define
player i’s active neighbor set given action profile a ∈ A as
N ∗i (a) = {j ∈ Ni : aj ∈ {, 1}}.
The active edge set of the network in action profile a is
E∗(a) := {(i, j) ∈ EB : ai, aj ∈ {, 1}}.
At each iteration k, the greedy algorithm selects the player
i∗k that, upon holding its action fixed at ai∗k = δi ∈ {0, 1},
results in the most number of active edges eliminated by the
time the system dynamics converge. We call the number of
such links eliminated from choosing any player i in the action
profile a the cascade potential of player i,
CPi(a, δi) = |E∗(a)| − |E∗(Φn(a, {i}t≥0, {δi}t≥0))|.
The process repeats, incrementally building up the player
control set Xˆ , until all active edges are eliminated from the
network. The algorithm is detailed below.
Algorithm 2 (Greedy algorithm)
Initialize: a0i =  for all i ∈ N
Xˆ (0) = ∅
δˆ = 0n
k ← 0
while
∑
(i,j)∈EB a
k
i a
k
j 6= 0
1) Allow dynamics to run until convergence
ak+1 ← Φn(ak, Xˆ (k), 0n)
2) Store convergence time
tk ← min{t ≤ n : Φt(ak, Xˆ (k), 0n) = Φt−1(ak, Xˆ (k), 0n)}
3) Selection criterion
(i∗k, δi∗k)← rand
i ∈ argmax
i:ak+1i ∈{,1}
δi∈{0,1}
CPi(ak+1, δi)

4) Update control set
Xˆ (k + 1)← Xˆ (k) ∪ i∗k
δˆi∗k ← δi∗k
5) k ← k + 1
end
Xˆ ← Xˆ (k)
end
If multiple players satisfy the maximum cascade potential
criterion in step 3, ties are broken by random selection. The
looping condition
∑
(i,j)∈EB a
k
i a
k
j 6= 0 makes sure that we
select players to control until no links remain active, that is,
aki a
k
j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ EB .
We also consider a few variants of the above algorithm by
replacing the selection criterion in step 3) by
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a) i∗k ← rand(i ∈ argmaxi:aki ∈{,1} |N ∗i (ak)|)
δˆi∗k ← 0 (max degree)
b) i∗k ← rand({i : (i, j) ∈ E∗(ak+1) for some j})
δˆi∗k ← 0 (rand)
c) i∗k ← rand(i ∈ argmaxi,δi CPi(ak+1, δi) +∑n
j=1 1(a
k+1
j 6= akj ) (CP 2)
d) Here, replace Algorithm 2 after Initialize with
a¯← Φn(a0)
Xˆ = VC(E∗(a¯))
where VC is the minimum vertex cover scheme detailed
in (16) of the resulting active network after the first
convergence of the dynamics.
In a), a player with the maximum number of active neigh-
boring links is selected to play action 0. We denote this the
“max degree” variant. In b), one player connected to the active
network is selected uniformly at random with forced action 0.
This algorithm called “rand”. A variant of cascade potential,
which we call “CP2” , is described in c), which selects the
node that has the highest cascade potential in addition to
inducing the most amount of players to change their action
(see Remark 1 for motivation). In d), we select the control set
as the minimum vertex cover as specified in (16) of Theorem
2. Note that in variants “max degree”, “rand”, and “VC”, the
forced actions are always δˆi = 0, since it guarantees active
edges to be eliminated (immediate neighbors). In the CP-based
algorithms, δˆi can either be 0 or 1, depending on which results
in the most “cascaded” active links broken.
Proposition 9 For all variants of Algorithm 2, a resulting
control set (Xˆ , δˆ) is a feasible static control policy of MP-
CAC. A feasible dynamic policy (X ,∆) is also produced by
implementing control on the players ik in the order they were
selected, and holding aik = 0 for all times:
X t =
{
Xˆ (k), for ∑k−1m=0 tm ≤ t <∑km=0 tm
Xˆ , for t ≥∑k¯m=0 tm
∆t = δˆ, for all t ≥ 0
with
∑−1
m=0 tm ≡ 0.
Proof: Consider the static policy (Xˆ , 0n). By the definition of
Algorithm 2, step 1 at the last iteration k ensures maximum
anti-coordination, where the control set used is Xˆ (k) = Xˆ .
That is, Φn(ak, Xˆ (k), 0n) gives an action profile with max-
imum anti-coordination. It is also true that Φn(~, Xˆ (k), 0n)
gives the same action profile because the players in Xˆ were
iteratively selected to eliminate all active links. If active links
appeared as a result of a selection, these links are ensured
to be eliminated in a subsequent iteration of the algorithm.
Hence, (Xˆ , 0n) is a feasible static MPCAC solution.
The policy (X t,∆) is a feasible dynamic MPCAC solution
because it simply mimics the iterations of Algorithm 2. 
Remark 1 In practice, Algorithm 2 (CP variant, as written)
will find the optimal solution to the star network of Proposition
1. For the line network Proposition 3, it finds the optimal
solution in cases (b-e) always, and in cases (a,f) with some
probability. In case (a), this is due to the possibility that the
algorithm can select two players with different types along
the line, which causes redundancies in control because the
vertex cover S1 is the optimal control choice by Corollary 1.
In case (f), the algorithm could select a player one node from
an endpoint (since it cascades the same number of links as any
other player), when it could have selected the player two nodes
from the endpoint, which covers more of the network and still
causes the endpoint player to decide. This is the motivation
behind introducing the CP2 variant - with this algorithm, it
chooses the player two nodes from an endpoint with certainty
because it causes the same number of cascaded links, but
causes more players to change their decision.
VIII. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Algorithm 2 and its
variants in numerical simulations over randomly generated
bipartite networks. We generate a random bipartite network
of size n by assigning half of the players to S0, and the other
half S1 (assuming n is even). A link (i, j) between i ∈ S0 and
j ∈ S1 is present with independent probability pB ∈ (0, 1).
In Figure 5, the control effort for three variants of Algorithm
2 is mapped over varying values of c0, c1. The quantity b1/c0c
is the largest number of neighbors not playing action 0 a
player in S0 can have to still play action 1 as a dominant
action. Similarly, b1/c1c is the largest number of neighbors not
playing action 0 for an S1 node. As both c−10 and c
−1
1 increase,
more control is necessary because more nodes will be playing
dominant action 1. For c−10 low and c
−1
1 high, no control effort
is necessary to achieve maximum anti-coordination because S1
nodes will play dominant action 1, and S0 nodes in turn will
choose dominant action 0. With both c−10 , c
−1
1 low, no nodes
can initially decide. Hence, a large control effort is needed to
cause the remaining nodes to play action 1.
In Figure 6, we plot the performance of Algorithm 2 and
its variants by measuring the control effort |Xˆ |/n, the fraction
of players selected. In the left panel, b1/c0c = b1/c1c = 0
- no players will decide without external control. Here, the
CP-based algorithms perform significantly better than either
variant because forcing δi = 1 will cause all neighbors to play
action 0. Max degree and VC have comparable performance
here. In the center panel, b1/c0c = b1/c1c = 2 - a player has
strictly dominant action 1 if two or less neighbors do not play
action 0. The performance of the CP-based algorithms slightly
worsen, while the variants slightly improve. In the right panel,
b1/c0c = b1/c1c = 1. Here, the VC variant performs worse
than “rand”, suggesting that the vertex covering scheme can
in some cases be inefficient as a control policy. Overall, the
CP-based algorithms outperform all other variants due to their
exploitation of “cascades” by using the inherent dynamics Φ
to eliminate active links.
IX. CONCLUSION
We considered the control of players’ learning processes
in a population to influence the emergent outcome in the
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Fig. 5. The control effort |Xˆ |/n used by Algorithm 2 on 20-node random bipartite networks, with pB = 0.3 (expected degree of 3). Each payoff constant
c0, c1 takes ten different values selected such that mci > 1 > (m− 1)ci for m = 1, . . . , 10 and for i = 0, 1. Each value in the grid results from averaging
the resulting control effort from 1000 independent realizations of the network.
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Fig. 6. The fraction of nodes |Xˆ |/n (control effort) to achieve maximum anti-coordination vs size of the network among the five variants of Algorithm 2.
The network is a bipartite network of size N , ranging from N = 10 to 70 with +5 increments. Each node is independently randomly chosen type 0 or 1
with equal probability, and the link (i, j), i ∈ S0 j ∈ S1, is drawn with probability 6/N , to achieve an expected degree of 3. The CP-based algorithms
outperform the other variants.
context of anti-coordination network games. With the goal to
promote maximum anti-coordination with minimum effort, we
developed computationally tractable methods that determine
when to control which players, and how to control them.
An algorithm that sequentially selected players according to
their influence in promoting anti-coordination in the future
performed well in random networks with arbitrary population
sizes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We show that Algorithm 1 is equivalent to the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies in Definition 2.
This equivalence yields convergence to Nash equilibrium if the
game is dominance solvable. Otherwise, it yields elimination
of all the strictly dominated actions.
We prove by induction. Given a0i = ~, at time k = 1
each player that selects action 1 (a1i ) by (2) eliminates all the
other actions in [0, 1). To see this consider the best response
of player i given in (6) where BRi(aNi) ≥ BRi(da0Nie)
for all aNi ∈ [0, 1]|Ni|. Further note that da0Nie = 1|Ni|.
If BRi(1|Ni|) = 1 then it is best to play action 1 against
all possible actions of neighboring players by the previous
inequality. Hence, by (8), all actions in [0, 1) are strictly
dominated by a1i = 1.
Consider now time k given action profile ak−1 where
players that decided ak−1i ∈ {0, 1} have eliminated rest of
their actions. Define the not strictly dominated action space of
each player i ∈ N as Ak−1i = {1} if ak−1i = 1, Ak−1i = {0} if
ak−1i = 0, and A
k−1
i = [0, 1] if a
k−1
i =  (recall the notation
in Definiton (2)). For any player i, we have BRi(aNi) ≥
BRi(dak−1Ni e) and BRi(aNi) ≤ BRi(bak−1Ni c) for any aNi ∈
Ak−1Ni . Using the first inequality, if BRi(dak−1Ni e) = 1 then
it is best to play action 1 against all possible non-dominated
actions of neighboring players. That is, action 1 dominates all
possible actions of player i. Using the second inequality, if
BRi(bak−1Ni c) = 0 then it is best to play action 0 against all
possible non-dominated actions of neighboring players. That
is, action 0 dominates all possible actions of player i.
Given the definition of the best response in (6), eliminating
all the actions except 1 if BRi(dak−1Ni e) = 1 is equivalent
to the condition given in (2). Similarly, eliminating all the
actions except 0 if BRi(bak−1Ni c) is equivalent to the condition
given in (3). Combined with the above argument, given the
action profile at time k − 1 (ak−1), one step of Algorithm 1
yields an action profile ak where decided players eliminate
all strictly dominated actions given the not strictly dominated
action space Ak−1. Since at time k = 1 the update eliminated
strictly dominated strategies, Algorithm 1 is equivalent to the
iterated elimination process given in Definition 2 by induction.
Given this equivalence, if the game is dominance solvable,
the algorithm converges to the unique Nash equilibrium.
Otherwise, all decided players eliminate all of the actions
except the action they selected, and undecided players cannot
eliminate any actions from the their initial action space [0, 1].
Next, we prove convergence in n time steps. Suppose at time
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step k given ak−1, there does not exist a player that switches
from being undecided, i.e., ak−1i = , to being decided, i.e.,
aki = {0, 1}. That is, if aki = ak−1i then ak+1i = aki . Further, if
a player is decided, it cannot change its action because all the
other possible actions are dominated, that is, if aki = {0, 1},
then ak+1i = a
k
i . Given these two observations, at least one
player has to switch to being decided at time k−1, in order for
at least one player to become decided at time k given that it
was undecided at time k−1. There can at most be n instances
of switching from being undecided to being decided which is
the case when the game is dominance solvable. Further there
needs to be at least one switching happening at each time step
for the updates to continue. Hence, the algorithm converges in
at most n steps.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Dominance solvability implies Algorithm 1 converges to a
unique Nash equilibrium aNE defined in (5). This means the
second constraint of dynamic MPCAC is satisfied by time
n. There are two possible Nash equilibrium action profiles:
aNE satisfies maximum anti-coordination constraint (first con-
straint) in (12), or aNE does not satisfy it. If aNE satisfies
the maximum anti-coordination constraint, then the optimal
control profile that minimizes the objective is the empty set
(X t∗ = ∅). If aNE does not satisfy maximum anti-coordination
constraint, we need to control a non-empty set of players to
achieve maximum anti-coordination by time n. Assume now
the optimal control profile after time n is empty, i.e., X t∗ = ∅
for t > n. Then because the game is dominance solvable, we
have a2n = Φn(an) = aNE where Φk(·) is defined in (4). That
is, by time t = 2n, players will revert to aNE which violates
the first constraint in (12). Hence, a control profile X t∗ = ∅
for t > n cannot be optimal because it is not feasible when
aNE is not feasible.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose the optimal policy Π∗ to dynamic MPCAC in (12)
is such that it does not converge to an equilibrium of the game
a∗ that achieves maximum anti-coordination, i.e., a∗i +a
∗
j ≤ 1
for all (i, j) ∈ EB . It means there must at least be one player
controlled after t ≥ n to achieve maximum anti-coordination
for all times t ≥ n. That is, in the best case scenario we have
to control a single player after t ≥ n. Further, there must at
least be one player that is controlled for one time step before
time n to achieve anti-coordination at time n. Combining the
cost for control before and after time n, the optimal value
attained by Π∗ will at least be 1/n+ 1.
If there exists an equilibrium a∗ that achieves maximum
anti-coordination, then Algorithm 1 cannot converge to an
action profile an with an active link, i.e., a link (i, j) ∈ EB
where ani + a
n
j > 1, because it would imply the equilibrium
action profile a∗ is strictly dominated by an action profile, an.
This means that Algorithm 1 can only eliminate possibly active
links. Hence, the worst case scenario in terms of cost of control
is when all players remain undecided as a result of Algorithm
1, i.e., an = ~. In this case, a feasible solution is one where
we control the players in a given type (X t = {i : si = 0} or
X t = {i : si = 1}) for two time steps, e.g., for t = 0, 1. This
causes the players in the other type N \ X 0 to play action
1 by (10) at t = 1. That is, a0i = 0 if i ∈ X 0, and a0i = 1
if i ∈ N \ X 0. In step t = 1, we continue to implement the
control by X 1, then the players in X 1 take action 0 by (10),
i.e., a1i = x
1
i δ
1
i = 0 for i ∈ X 1, and a1i = y1i = Φ(a0) = 1 if
i ∈ N \X 1. When we remove the control of players in X t for
t > 2, players do not change their actions because the resultant
action profile is an equilibrium. If we select the type with the
lowest number of players, then our cost for this control policy
is at most bn/2c for one step. Hence, the objective value in
(12) is at most (|X 0|+ |X 1|)/n = 1. This policy is an upper
bound on the optimal policy. Consequently, Π∗ that achieves
a cost of 1/n+ 1 cannot be optimal.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
When all players are decided in a single time step, all
players decide on taking action 1 using (2), that is, a = 1n×1
where = 1n×1 is an n × 1 vector with all elements equal to
one.
Claim 1 X t∗ = ∅ for t < n.
Proof : Suppose there exists an optimal policy Π such that
X t¯∗ 6= ∅ for t¯ < n. Given the controlled action profile at time
t¯, at¯, we have the uncontrolled action profile at time t+ 1 as
yt¯+1 = 1. Hence, the uncontrolled action profile at time n is
given by 1. As a result, a policy where X t = ∅ for t < n
and X t = X t∗ for t ≥ n would be feasible and would incur a
smaller cost than the policy Π by an amount 1n
∑n−1
t=1 |X t∗ |. 
We continue with the proof of Corollary 1. By Claim 1,
no control action is taken until time n. At time n, we have
yn = 1n×1. Given yn, the optimal control policy at time n is
given by the following single time-step optimization,
min
X
|X | (21)
s.t. ai + aj ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ EB
ai = 1− xi for all i ∈ N
ai ∈ {0, 1}.
We note that if a player is controlled, xi = 1, then it must
be that δi = 0 because ani = 1 for all i. Hence, we have the
second constraint from the controlled dynamics, (1−xi)ani +
δixi = 1 − xi. Define the dynamic control policy X¯ where
X¯ t = ∅ for t < n, and we implement X¯n, which is the solution
to the above optimization problem, for t ≥ n.
Suppose there exists X˜ that achieves a lower cost than X¯ in
the dynamic MPCAC problem. Given the first constraint above
it is guaranteed that the controlled dynamics Φn(~, X¯ ,∆) yield
an action profile at time n that achieves anti-coordination.
By Claim 1, it must be that X˜ t = ∅ for t < n. Note that
there cannot exist policy at time n such that |X˜n| < |X¯n|
because X¯n is an optimal solution of (21). If |X˜n| > |X¯n|
then we can use X¯ to obtain a smaller cost (∑nt=1 |X˜ t| >∑n
t=1 |X¯ t| = |X¯n|) for the first n time steps. Further, the
uncontrolled action profile at time n+ 1 is given by yn+1 =
Φ1(a
n) = 1n×1 where controlled action of player i is given
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by ani = 1 − x∗i for x∗i ∈ X¯n. Hence, there cannot exist a
control policy X˜ t such that |X˜ t| < |X¯ t| for t > n by the
same reasoning as above. Combining the above findings, we
have the dynamic MPCAC objective for the control policy X˜
as 1n |X˜n|+limT ′→∞ 1T ′
∑T ′
t=n+1 |X˜ t| > (1/n+1)|X¯n|. This
is a contradiction.
Substituting ai = 1− xi in the constraint ai + aj ≤ 1, we
get xi + xj ≥ 1 when xi ∈ {0, 1} and xj ∈ {0, 1}. Note
that EB = En and Nn = N given ani = 1. Hence, the last
constraint in (13) does not exist when an = 1. This shows
that the optimization in (21) is equivalent to the optimization
problem (13) when an = 1.
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